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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM,

1967.

No. 67.
JOHN W. TERRY,

Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF OHIO,

Respondent.

BRIEF OF AMERICANS FOR EFFECTIVE LAW
ENFORCEMENT, AS AMICUS CURIAE.
Interest of the Amicus Curiae .
.A:mericans for Effective Law Enforcement is a nonpartisan, non-political, not-for-profit organization, incorporated under the laws of the State of Illinois in 1966. It
has also been declared a tax-exempt, educational corporation
by the United States Treasury Department.
Although generally concerned with the problems of crime
and the effective administration of criminal justice in
America, a specific objective of AELE is participation
in significant cases, in this and other courts, which will, by.
their holdings, profoundly affect not only the rights of individual defendants confronted by the processes of the law,
but also the right of all our citizens to ''secure for themselves the domestic tranquility and justice that has been
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guaranteed in the Preamble to The Constitution of the
United States.' 71
Like another amicus in this case,2 AELE is concerned
about persons beyond the litigants, and about issues beyond
those immediately raised by the litigants' briefs.
Without derogating the concern of another amicus for
the innocent citizens who are subjected to :field interrogations-and especially those who have been the victims of
abusive field interrogations--it needs to be made clear that
there are other Americans, by far the majority, who have
an interest in seeing that reasonable, non-abusive police
procedures which prevent crime and catch criminals are
sustained by the courts.
AELE 's deep rooted interest on behalf of the citizenry
at large is embodied in recent statements appearing in
the President's Crime Commission Report:
''There is much crime in America, more than ever is
reported, far more than ever is solved, far too much
for the health of the nation. Every American knows
that. Every American is, ·in a sense, a victim of crime.
Violence and theft have not only injured, often irreparably, hundreds of thousands of citizens, but have
directly affected everyone.''
'' ... the fear of crimes of violence is not a simple
fear of injury, or death or even of all crimes of violence, but, at bottom, a fear of strangers. • • • This fear
of strangers has greatly impoverished the lives of
many Americans, especially those who live in highcrime neighborhoods in large cities. People stay behind
the locked doors of their homes rather than risk walking in the streets at night. Poor people spend money on
taxis because they are afraid to walk or use public
transportation. Sociable people are afraid to talk to
those they do not know. In short, society is to an in1. Preamble to the By-Laws of .Americans For Effective Law
Enforcement, Inc., 2.
2.

The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
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creasing extent suffering from what economists call
'opportunity costs' as the result of fear of crime. • • •
'Vhen many persons stay home, they are not availing
themselves of the opportunities offered in their communities, and they are not visiting their friends as frequently as they might. The general level of social
interaction in the society is reduced.
When fear of crime becomes fear of the stranger the
social order is further damaged. As the level of socialability and mutual trust is reduced, streets and public
places can indeed become more dangerous. Not only
will there be fewer people abroad but those who are
abroad will manifest a fear of and a lack of concern
for each other. The reported incidents of bystanders
indifferent to cries for help are the logical consequence
of a reduced sociability, mutual distrust and withdrawal.
However, the most dangerous aspect of a fear of
strangers is its implication that the moral and social
order of society are of doubtful trustworthiness and
stability. Everyone is dependent on this order to instill in all members of society a respect for the persons
and possessions of others. When it appears that there
are more and more people who do not have this respect,
the security that comes from living in an orderly and
tn1stworthy society is undermined. The tendency of
many people to think of crime in terms of increasing
moral deterioration is an indication that they are
losing their faith in their society. And so the costs of the
fear of crime to the social order may ultimately be even
greater than its psychological costs to individuals." 3
We have set forth these apprehensions of the American
people at length because we believe they vitally relate to
the questions involved in this case. We believe that if field
interrogation, or "stop and frisk" as it is most commonly
(and sometimes most inappropriately) called is found to be
3. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT A.ND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 1, 52 (hereinafter cited as CoHHISSION
REPORT).
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at odds with the Constitution, the ability of the police to prevent crime and catch criminals will be sharply constrained.
And the consequent physical and social impoverishment of
our people will, tragically, increase.•
Apart from the desire of AELE to give voice to the
American public concerned about crime and its consequences, we believe that it is important to also express
what we think are the views of the law enforcement profession as a whole, unrestricted by the needs or desires to
uphold a particular decision or to sustain a particular
arrest or search. This position can be assumed by an
amicus whereas it may not be available to a litigant. The
importance of our stating these views is obvious in the light
of the following considerations:
" ... many ... decisions [are] made without the
needs of law enforcement, and the police policies that
are designed to meet those needs, being effectively presented to the court. If judges are to balance accurately
law enforcement needs against human rights, the former
must be articulated. They seldom are. Few legislatures and police administrators have defined in detail
how and under what conditions certain police practices
are to be used. As a result, the courts often must rely
exclusively on intuition and common sense in judging
what kinds of police action are reasonable or necessary, even though their decisions about the actions of
one police officer can restrict police activity in the
entire nation.'' 5
4. "In society's day-to-day efforts to protect its citizens from
the suffering, fear, and property loss produced by crime and the
threat of crime, the policeman occupies the front line. It is he who
directly confronts criminal situations, and it is to him that the
public looks for personal safety. The freedom of Americans to
walk their streets and be secure in their homes---in fact, to do what
they want when they want-depends to a great extent on their
policemen.'' COMMISSION REPORT 92.
5.

COMMISSION REPORT

94.
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5
Finally, we ask that the arguments which follow be judged
in the light of the stated policy of AELE to support equal
justice and equal treatment for all.'
The consents of the parties to our appearance as amicus
in this case have been filed with the Clerk of this Court.

6. ''In pursuing its objectives, AELE will adhere to the fundamental principles of justice and equal protection for all irrespective
of color, creed, religion, social status or other individual or group
characteristics. It emphatically rejects the support of, and will not
support any individual, group, or activity that advocates racial
bias or other unconstitutional concepts.'' By-Laws of Americans
for Effective Law Enforcement 2.
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ARGUMENT.
"To question all things .. .
above all, to insist upon, having
the meaning of a word clearly
understood before using it, and
the meaning of a proposition
before assenting to it. . . . " 7

I.
WHAT STOP AND FRISK IS-AND WHAT IT IS NOT.

The law enforcement process which we ask this Court to
sustain in the ''stop and frisk'' cases under consideration
is simply this: A police officer may detain pedestrians or
motorists in public places, and question them as to their
identity and purpose in the particular location, when under
the circumstances, such detention and questioning seems
appropriate to a prudent police officer-one mindful of his
responsibility "to prevent crime and catch criminals " 8because reasonable suspicion of criminality has been
aroused, although there is not yet probable cause to believe
that a crime has been, or is being, committed. Whether
such police conduct violates the Fourth Amendment is the
core of these cases. We believe that it does not.
All other issues in the cases are subsidiary. One, however, should be mentioned at this point, and it is of considerable importance: If the above described police conduct is c0nstitutional, as we believe it is, the officer involved
7. From the inaugural address of John Stuart Mill as Rector,
University of St. Andrews, February 1, 1867.
8. The phrase of Mr. Justice Schaefer for the Supreme Court
of Illinois in People v. Watkins, 19 Ill. 2d 11, 19, 166 N. E. 2d 433,
437 (1960).
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must have the power to act reasonably to protect himself
from attack, or to prevent the suspect 's escape, during
the course of the detention and inquiry. Whether such
power implicates only a "frisk", or authorizes a "search",
is a question to which we shall return later.
One of the problems, of course, in pursuing a rational
discussion of field interrogation is to be rid of the tyranny
of labels to which the discussion about "stop and frisk"
has been subjected in recent years by lawyers as well as
laymen. Whether the process is known as ''stop and
frisk", "stop and question", "street stop", or "field interrogation", is not only unimportant, but misleading
as well.
The power which we ask this Court to sustain will not
receive appropriate analysis if the analysis proceeds upon
the assumption, usually colored by emotional reaction to
the phrase, that "stop" means an arbitrary selection
of subjects and that "frisk" automatically follows a stop.
On the other hand, we make no claim that arbitrary police
action is any the less so because concealed behind the more
neutral sounding facade of "field interrogation". We
cannot, at this juncture, afford to get ''hung up'' on
the name.
For this confusion law enforcement must share at least
part, or perhaps most, of the blame. Traditionally, the
term ''field interrogation,'' has been used to describe a
mixed bag of police techniques in aid of the patrol process,
some of which are constitutional and some not.
''A field interrogation is, in some circumstances,
difficult to distinguish from an arrest and subsequent
street questioning before the arrested person is taken
to the station. In other circumstances, a field interrogation may be difficult to distinguish from crime-preventive street practices which have an objective other than
arrest and prosecution of suspects. This is true, for
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example, with respect to a street confrontation program designed to discover and confiscate knives, guns,
and other weapons. Despite the difficulty in some
situations of clearly distinguishing field interrogation
from arrest, on the one hand, or from police on-thestreet preventive practices, on the other, observation
of current police practice does disclose that field interrogation is an isolable police practice which has independent operational significance.' ' 9
vVe also believe that the kind of field interrogation described in our definition is an isolable police practice that
can be sustained as constitutional. vVhatever value the
police attach to concomitant aspects of patrol as crime
repression measures, however, cannot obscure the fact that
their use is subject to serious constitutional question.
What is important is the necessity, for present purposes,
that the impermissible patrol practices be clearly identiiied
and put to one side.
A current commentary on police patrol practices identifies at least three other techniques which may, in some
instances, resemble the police field interrogation power
for which we contend. These are: (1) the practice of
regularly, and without particular cause, interrogating·,
searching, and sometimes arresting, known vice offenders ;10
( 2) the practice of routine searches of males, particularly
young males, in high crime areas, to discover and con:fiscate weapons ;11 and (3) the searching and dispersal from
the streets of congregating members of teen-age gangs. 12
All of these techniques, stated abstractedly, may be, and
probably are, violative of the Fourth Amendment. We
would not ask this Court to a pprove them, efficacious as they
9. TIFFANY, McINTYRE & ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME 9
(1967) (hereinafter cited as DETECTION) (Emphasis added.)
10. DETECTION 11-12.
11. DETECTION 13.
12. DETECTION 13-14.
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may be as crime prevention measures. The point we make
is that they can be distinguished, and must he distinguished,
from the practice of stopping particular persons, found in
particular circumstances which indicate past, occurring, or
potential criminal conduct, for the purpose of questioning
-in some cases, followed, or even preceded, by the protective device of frisk or search for weapons. We reject
absolutely the position of the other a1nicus,13 and some of
the commentators,14 that this Court must also sustain these
practices if our position be adopted.
The kind of constitutional field interrogation which can
be isolated from other practices is illustrated by two cases:
Terry v. Ohio, in which we appear as amicus, and State v.
Duley, 40 N. J. 460, 231 A. 2d 353 (1967), a recent decision
of the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
In Terry, a detective with thirty-nine years of experience
observed two men on a street corner in downtown Cleveland. For a period of ten to twelve minutes, he watched
them as first one, then the_other, repeatedly walked down
the street, peered into the windo'v of a jewelry store or an
airline office, and then returned to converse. Shortly they
were joined by a third man. A conversation ensued and the
third man then departed. Thereafter, the original two
walked several hundred feet down the street and again
engaged in conversation with the third man. At this point,
the detective, whose suspicions had been thus aroused, approached the three men, identified himself as a police officer
and asked for their names. \\"hen he received only a
mumbled reply, he turned one man around and patted down
the outside of his clothing. This frisk revealed a hard
13. Cf. Brief for the NAACP as Amicus Curiae 45.
14. Schwartz, Stop And Frisk: A Case Study in JudicUil Control of the Police, 58 J. CRIM. L., C. & P. S. 433, 443-44 (1967). But
see Pilcher, The Law and Practice of Field Interrogation, 58 J .
CRIM. L., C. & P . S. 465, 469 (1967); Younger, Stop and Frisk:
"Say It Like It Is", 58 J. CRIM. L., C. & P. S. 293, 295 (1967).
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object which, upon seizure, turned out to be a revolver..
All three men were then ordered into a store and told to
face the wall. A frisk of the second man disclosed another
revolver. A frisk of the third man disclosed nothing.
The record is clear in Terry concerning the purposes for
which the original stop and subsequent frisk were made.
The officer testified that he approached the defendants to
question them because "he suspected them of casing a job,
a stick.up''. When he received only a mumbled reply, he
frisked them because ''I felt as though they were going to
pull a stick·up and they may have a gun ".15 In this case,
therefore, there is no question about the motives of the
officer. He was not engaged in an arbitrary or random
stopping of persons on the street. He was not engaged in
suppression of vice activities by the seizures of known vice
offenders. He was not concerned with ''getting the
weapons off the street'' of an urban ghetto. He was not
seeking to establish his authority over the ''turf'' sought
to be ruled by teen.age gang members. He was not seeking
to ferret out contraband. He was investigating particular
persons found in particular circumstances which indicated
to him, as a reasonable and experienced police officer,
that a crime might be about to occur, and he was doing it
in a manner entirely, and purposefully, concerned with his
own safety.

It may be argued that the conduct deemed suspicious by
the officer in Terry could just as well have been innocent.
The men could have been waiting for someone on the street
corner. Another companion could have been making a
purchase in the jewelry store and a display in the window
of the airline office could have caught the eye of his friends
waiting outside. The conversation with the third man
might have been on some subject irrelevant to their im·
15. State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 122, 214 N. E. 2d 114, 120
(Ct. App. 1966) .

511

11
mediate purpose. But even in cases involving probable
cause for arrest, it has never been held that the conduct of
the defendants under examination must be entirely consistent with guilt and utterly inconsistent with innocence.
Such a holding, indeed, would destroy the concept of probable cause as a viable standard.
An even stronger case is presented by Dilley. Here a
veteran member of the New Brunswick police department
was patrolling a high crime area in a police car at 3 :00
A. M:. ''He knew the a·r ea very well, having been born and
brought up there, and he described it in detail. He had
worked in the area as a police officer for fifteen years, knew
the people there and both Dilley and Brinkley [a co-defendant] were strangers to him." As. the two men were walking
down the street, ''they kept turning their heads every few
steps 109king to the rear''. ''He drove on, making a series
of turns, until he observed the men standing between two
automobiles in a municipal parking lot. As he pulled into
the lot, the men turned and walked back to the street. He
followed and called to them to stop. He got out of his
car, asked them what they were doing there and they replied 'nothing'. He told them they were under arrest and
he gave the defendant Dilley 'a quick frisk' by patting
him on the right side of his ski jacket. He felt a gun in
Dilley's pocket and removed it. It was a loaded .38 caliber
revolver. The other man . . . was also found to be
armed. " 16
Reasonable men might well differ on whether the officer
had probable cause for arrest when he stopped the men
and frisked them, and, in fact, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey declined to so hold. But reasonable men cannot differ, we believe, on whether there was, at that time,
a n~asonable suspicion of criminality which justified the
officer in detaining the men for the purposes of furlher in16. State v. Dilley, 40 N. J. 460, 231 A. 2d 353, 354 (1967).
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quiry. It is also important to note that the officer did not
stop the men simply because they were walking down the
street of a high-crime, low-income neighborhood at 3 :00
A. M. and were unknown to him, nor did he stop them
because they were standing between two parked cars. He
stopped them only after they walked away from the lot as
he pulled in~ and he frisked them only after they gave an
answer to his question which ascribed no reasonable purpose to their conduct.

In sanctioning what the officer did in Dilley, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey did not, therefore, subject persons
roaming the streets of the ghetto late at night to random
or arbitrary stops and searches simply because of such
behavior. People are entitled, we suppose, to walk the
streets of a city at 3 :00 A. ~L with no purpose in mind. This
right, however, does not immunize them from reasonable
police inquiry when such conduct, considered in light of
other circumstances, renders it reasonable for the police
to inquire into possible criminality. The fact that innocent
men may also walk the streets late at night does not immunize all who do so under all circumstances.
Here again, as was the case with Terry, no improper
motive for the frisk can be imputed, on this record, to the
officer. As the Supreme Court of New Jersey found,
"When he frisked Dilley he did it for self-protection. He
described his action as 'common police procedure' in accordance with formal instructions he had received in both
federal and state police schools. He stressed that he was
alone when he confronted the two men, that he did not
know 'what they were carrying' and that it was 'very well
possible' he could have been 'killed by one of them.' ''11
"\Ve repeat that the police conduct involved in Terry and
Dilley is the kind of conduct which can rightly be called
17. 231 A. 2d at 354.
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proper field interrogation. It may be separated, in the
minds of the police and in the opinions of the courts, from
related, but clearly distinguishable, field procedures which
have as their purpose the suppression of vice, the confiscation of weapons, or the establishment of police "authority'' over the streets in high-crime areas. More importantly, it may be sustained as constitutional without licensing either its abuse or the other practices of repression.
It cannot be denied that stopping persons on the street
for questioning which involves detention against the will
and, in some cases, a concurrent or subsequent frisk or
search, is conduct subject to the commands of the Fourth
Amendment. If the standard by which such conduct is to
be judged, tberefore, is the same standard of probable
cause traditionally required for arrest, we concede that
such conduct is, under the prior opinions of this Court,
unconstitutional. But we believe that such an inflexible
application of traditional probable cause to this conduct
would be at odds with the whole spirit of the Fourth
Amendment; that there may be a concept of variable
probable cause which applies to pre-arrest investigatory
procedures such as field interrogation, and that the true
test is the balancing of the degree of interference with personal liberty against the information possessed by the
officer which impelled him to act. This argument, and
others, can best be made in response to specific issues
raised by the brief for the NAACP Legal Defense And
Educational Fund, Inc., as amicus curiae, and we turn,
the refore, to a consideration of some of their arguments.
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II.
THE PosmoN OF THE OPPONENTS OF STOP AND FRISK.

"The evidence is weighty and uncontradicted that
stop and frisk power is employed by the police most frequently against the inhabitants of om· inner cities, racial
minorities and the underprivileged. " 18
(1)

We are somewhat at a loss to appreciate the force of this
argument in the Brief of the NAACP. It could as well be
said that the arrest power is employed by the police most
frequently against the inhabitants of our inner cities, racial
minorities, and the underprivileged. Are the arrest statutes
to be struck down on this account f Those who deal intimately with the day-to-day process of criminal justice in
this country can testify that the entire machinery of the
criminal law ensnares the poor more often than the wealthy,
and this will continue to be true so long as poverty, lack of
education, and lack of employment opportunities persist as
causative crime factors. In many cities, minority group
defendants compose a disproportionate share of the cases
on the dockets of our criminal courts. Are they therefore
immune from prosecution, conviction and punishment T May
only the afiluent, suburbanite members of a racial majority
group be called to account for their crimes 1
Perhaps the amicus means more than this. Perhaps the
implication is that the stop and frisk power is wrongfully,
and by evil design, employed by the police most frequently
against the inhabitant s of our inner cities, racial minorities,
and the underprivileged. 19 If that is the argument, AELE
rejects the claim that the evidence is "weighty and uncontradicted' '.
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
18. Brief for the NAACP 3.
19. See Brief for the NAACP 45, n. 79.
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Administration of Justice .had this to say with respect to
the behavior of the police toward minority groups:
''Commission observers watched policemen work in
minority-group neighborhoods in a number of major
cities, and the commission has studied the findings of
those who have made observations in many other cities.
These observations indicate that any generalization
about how 'policemen' treat 'minority-group members',
or vice versa, is almost sure to be misleading. For
example, one commission study conducted in a few
cities showed that most policemen treat minority-group
citizens in a nondiscriminatory manner, and received at
least as much cooperation and courtesy from Negroes
as from whites. " 20
Following are statements that appear in the reports submitted to the Commission :
''All citizens were asked about their views whether
the police should have the right to stop them and question or search them. A substantial majority of the
citizens believe that the police should at least under
some conditions be able to stop and ask them their
names and addresses (79 percent); an absolute majority of 56 per cent sets no conditions for stopping
and asking them to identify themselves. In Boston
there are no differences between Negroes and whites
with almost 6 of 10 citizens saying they would not
object to the police asking them to stop and identify
themselves by name and address under any conditions.' ' 21 • • •
"Assuming that police discretion is greater in the
on-view encounter, it could also be assumed that officers
will exercise that discretion more often with Negroes
than whites (whether on grounds of a higher crime
rate for Negroes than whites in these cities or on
20.

COMMISSION REPORT

21.

1 STUDIE.S IN CRIME AND LAw ENFORCEMENT IN MAJOR

99-100.

METROPOLITAN AREAS (Field Surveys III) 87 (Report of a Research
Study Submitted to the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967).
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grounds of discrimination, or some other basis). Correlatively, aggravated assaults and other kinds of
violence are more commonly observed for Negroes than
whites in dispatched encounters in these cities so that
the officer more likely would need to search :N"egroes
than whites for his own protection in dispatched encounters. • • • Personal searches conducted on Negroes
are over twice as productive of weapons as are those
conducted on whites.
"In on-view situations one-in-five frisks of a Negro
yielded a gun; for whites the proportion was one-inten. • • •In both types of mobilization [dispa.tched and
on-view] the police more frequently conduct personal
searches on Negroes than on whites; Negroes object
less often, but they are more likely to be carrying
weapons fhan whites. • • • It is problematic whether
police officers cognitively as well as behaviorally search
those citizens upon whom their searches are most likely
to be successful. The observations do not allow for
inferences about police motivations. This 'attemptsuccess ratio' is clear as a behavioral phenomenon,
nevertheless.' '22
In any event, if the police more often exercise the power
of stop and frisk against inner city residents, the poor, and
the minority groups because a.ll the forces of the criminal
process operate more often against such persons, it follo\vs
that when the police wrongfully use such power-whether
by design or mistake-they will do so against the same
people. \Vhat does not follow, however, is the conclusion
that the proper exercise of such power should therefore be
declared unconstitutional.
(2)

" .. . the Court is now asked for the first time to

legitimate criminal investigative activity that significantly
intrudes ·upon the privacy of individuals who are undif22. 2 STUDIES IN CRIME AND
n. 21 (Emphasis in original. )

23.

LAW ENFORCEMENT,

85-88 Sltpra

Brief for the NAACP 10-11.
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f erentiable f1·om Everyman as the probable perpetrators
of a crinie. ''23
Other persons were walking the streets of Cleveland at
the time of the encounter which led to the stop, frisk and
arrest in the Terry case; they were not stopped, frisked,
and arrested. The record in this case makes plain that
there was conduct which reasonably differentiated Terry
from ''Everyman''. The record in the Dilley case makes
plain that there was conduct which reasonably differentiated Dilley and his companion from ''Everyman''.
The NAACP argument does not hold unless it is directed
to the m·bitrary conduct of police or to field investigative
procedures which are aimed at weapons confiscation and
are the refore directed against a large enough class to include, at least at that time and in that place, "Everyman".
The answer is that we are not asking this Court to "legitimate" such "criminal investigative activity". \Ve have
already said that such conduct is unconstitutional.
"However -intellectually reasonable Dean Barrett's
bala.ncing approach may be in the corridors of academe, it
is a delusive an,d unworkable proposition on the streets of
ou.r cities, and particularly on the streets of our ghettos
where stop-frisk logic does its daily work. Closely inspected,
we believe, both the 'balancing' theory of Fourth .Amendment rights mul the Stop-Frisk llf odel that is built upo1.,, it
show themselves to be m.ere fine, scholastic pretexts for
oppression. The 'minor interfe·rence with personal liberty'
that they sanction is a 1najor interference; the protections
which they promise are unreal illusions; the 'balance' scale
which they pitrport to employ is invariably tipped by the
police conimissioner's thumb; and their consequence is
nothing more or less than a police dictatorship of the
streets. " 2•
( 3)

1
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There are several things wrong with this argument.

First, the ai;gument assumes that only those who have
spent half their lives in squad cars, or perhaps all of their
lives on the streets of the ghetto, are qualified to speak on
the proper interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. Dean
Barrett is obviously not. Confined as he is to ''the corridors
of academe", spinning out theories both "delusive and unworkable", it is not surprising that his arguments are
viewed by some as only ''fine scholastic pretexts for oppression'' whose ''consequence is nothing more or less than a
police dictatorship of the streets".
If this attack were confined simply to Dean Barrett, perhaps one of the country's foremost commentators on the
criminal .law in general, and the Fourth Amendment in
particular, it could be discounted, questions of taste aside.
Alas, however, this Court also appears to have been taken
in by Dean Barrett. For in the same article26 in which he
suggested the balancing approach to the question of
Fourth Amendment applicat~on to pre-arrest investigatory
procedures, Dean Barrett severely criticized both the
rationales and consequences of this Court's holding in
Frank v. Maryland, a case that has lately been overruled,20
and precisely upon the grounds urged by him. But perhaps
the "corridors of academe" are merely one-way streets.
Second, Dean Barrett's argument, which the NAACP
characterizes as the ''most articulate expression'' of the
balancing rationale, is not fully treated in the amicus brief.
It deserves further explication here. Dean Barrett first
set forth the kinds of police conduct under scrutiny:
"Investigation is the process by which police are able
to acquire that 'probable cause' which will justify the
arrest and prosecution of a suspected offender. • • •
25. Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights, And The Fourth
Amendment. SUP. CT. REv. 46, 72-74 (1960).
26. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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The process of investigation necessarily involves

varying degrees of inter/erence with the privacy of
suspected offenders. 'Stakeouts' with the police watching a man's house, the tailing of suspects, the use of
undercover agents, and similar investigative techniques result, obviously, in invasions of privacy which
are offensive to the person involved. Stopping and
questioning suspicious persons on the street involves
a greater degree of restriction on personal liberty.

•••

Yet if the general public interest in adequate law
enforcement is to be served, it is clear that police
must be given reasonably wide powers of investigation. Furthermore, if the goal is to protect individuals
from the serious invasion of personal rights which results from formal a1·rests and charges of crime in the
absence of clear showing of probable cause to believe
that they have committed a crime, reasonable latitude
must be given for investigative techniques of the kind
just described. On the other hand, it is obvious that
some restraint must be placed upon the police because
indiscriminate use of these techniques could be unreasonably oppressive.' m .
He then described the difficulties encountered when
on-street investigative conduct is held to be an interference with liberty in the traditional sense of an ''arrest'' :
In applying the Fourth Amendment to the investigative process the Court makes the issue turn upon
traditional tort law concepts. • • • If he [the officer]
restricts the liberty of movement of the suspect sufficiently to commit the tort of false imprisonment, he
can justify his action only by demonstrating that he
had probable cause to make a formal arrest. • • •
The result of this all-or-nothing approach is to
place too little restraint on some investigative techniques and too great restraint on others. It tends to
defeat the fundamental objectives of the Fourth
27.
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Amendment by attempting to establish the same protection against relatively minor violations of person
and privacy as against the most serious ones. The
problems here can be illustrated by a consideration
of . . . [Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98 (1959) ]
,,28

..,-

Henry is the only case decided by this Court in which it
may be said that the question of the propriety of a field
interrogation on less. than probable cause was considered.
The facts of the case are simple. The FBI, in the process
of investigating the theft of an interstate shipment of
whiskey were told by an official of the trucking company
that the defendant Pierotti was somehow ''implicated'' with
interstate shipments. Thereafter Pierotti and the defendant Henry were seen leaving a tavern in the neighborhood
where the theft occurred. They drove away together, and
stopped in an alley in a residential neighborhood. Henry
entered a residence and returned with cartons. The automobile then drove away and was lost by the surveilling
agents. Sometime later the car was again seen near the
tavern and the defendants' actions were repeated. As the
car drove away from the residence a second time, loaded
with more cartons, it was curbed by the agents. As Henry
alighted from the car, he was heard to say to his companion
"Hold it; it is the G's", and "Tell him you just picked
me up". Looking into the car, the agents saw cartons
with ''interstate'' labels. The defendant told the agents
that the cartons were in the car when he and Pierotti had
borrowed it, a statement the agents knew to be untrue.
In Henry, the government conceded that an arrest took
place when the defendants' freedom of movement was
interrupted, that is, when the FBI signaled the car to the
28.

Id. at 58-59.
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curb. Finding no probable cause for arrest at this point,
a majority of this Court held the arrest to be unconstitutional.
Though the majority opinion in Henry simply holds that
arrests cannot be made without probable cause, there is
no explicit rejection of the proposition that investigative
actions not amounting to arrest may be made on less than
probable cause. Under these circumstances, it might well
be argued that the government 's concession foreclosed the
majority's consideration of this issue. The dissent in
Henry explicitly said that the officers possessed sufficient
information at the time of the stop to warrant further prearrest investigation; that this investigation could take the
form of a stop and detention for questioning; and that
probable cause was not required for this action. . Thereafter, the dissent argued, probable cause was found when
the nature of the information received by the agents during the stop was added to what they knew before the stop
was made. Mr. Justice Clark said:
''The oearlier events [prior to the stop] certainly disclosed ample grounds to justify the following of the
car, the subsequent stoppitig thereof, and the questioning of petitioner by the agents." 29
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In our view, .therefore, the dissenting opinion in Henry
is explicit authority for the proposition we advance in this
case: that a police officer having reasonable suspicion of
criminality may stop, detain, and question for the purpose
of ascertaining whether probable cause may be found to
support an arrest.
The NAACP, as amicu.s, contends that the government's
concession concerning the time of the arrest was not the
controlling factor in Henry since the opinion of the majority went on to say "That [the proposition that the arrest
29. 361 U.S. at 106.
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took place at the stop] is our view on the facts of this
particular case.." 30 If, indeed, this Court held in Henry
that an arrest requiring probable cause took place at the
time the FBI stopped the car, then, of course, Henry is
authority contrary to our position in this case. If that be
so, we request that Henry now be reconsidered and overruled.
The view that Henry stands for the proposition that prearrest :field detention cannot be made on less than probable
cause is also hard to reconcile with the Court's subsequent
disposition of Rios v. United States.31 There the government specifically argued that "the policemen approached
the standing taxi only for the purpose of routine interrogation, and that they had no intent to detain the petitioner
beyond the momentary requirements of such a mission''.
This argument was not challenged by the Court's opinion;
in fact the Court seemed to say that if the narcotics had
been exposed during such a period ''a lawful arrest could
then have been supported by their reasonable cause to believe that a felony was being committed in their presence".32
The case was then remanded for factual :findings on when
the arrest occurred. If Henry was decided, not upon the
government's concession, but upon the Court's view of the
facts, it follows that the Court would have held that the
arrest in Rios took place when the police approached the
taxi with the intention of detaining the defendant for the
purposes of interrogation and there would have been no
need for a remand.
In any event, the authority of Henry as support for the
argument that :field interrogation without probable cause
violates the Fourth Amendment is persuasively diminished,
we believe, by Dean Barrett's. conclusions, which we adopt:
30. 361 U.S. at 103 (Emphasis added.)
31. 364 u. s. 253 (1960).
32. 364 U.S. at 262.
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''The question may be asked whether it is wise to resolve -problems of the type presented in Henry and
Rios in terms of tort law concepts. • • • Would not the
policy of the Fourth Amendment be better served by an
approach which determines the reasonableness of each
investigative technique by balancing the seriousness of
the suspected crime and the degree of reasonable suspicion possessed by the police against the magnitude
of the invasion of the personal security and property
rights of the individual involved 1
If one looks at the problem in these terms, it becomes rational to argue that in Henry the police did
have sufficient grounds for suspicion to justify the relatively minor interference with the personal liberty and
property rights of Henry and Pierotti which was
involved in stopping their car, questioning them, and
looking through the open car door. In fact, did not
the police act in a way which properly balanced the
policies of the Fourth Amendment against the practical
consequences to the suspected individuals T'm
We believe that the recent opinion of this Court in
Camara v. 1.Iunicipal Court 34 · also supports the validity of
the argument that governmental intrusion into areas of
privacy may be measured in terms of degrees and that the
application of the Fourth Amendment in response to such
intrusions is not inflexible. In Cam,ara, the Court agreed
''that a routine inspection of the physical condition of
private property is a less hostile instrusion than the typical
policeman's search for the fruits and instrumentalities of
crime".315
'\Yhat is the. essential difference between that view and
a recognition that detention for field interrogation purposes involves ''a less hostile intrusion'' than an arrest
which leads to custody and the preferment of charges T We
submit there is none.
33. Barrett, supra n. 25 at 64.
34. 387 u. s. 523 (1967).
35. 387 U. S. at 530.
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The Camara opinion then goes on to say that even the
administrative search involved there was governed by
Fourth Amendment standards and that an individual's
rights under such a search were not merely "peripheral"
to the "Fourth Amendment interests at stake".36 But we
are willing to make the very same concession here. There
is no doubt that pre-arrest field detention for interrogation is conduct which is subject to regulation under the
Fourth Amendment and that when based on grounds
less than reasonable suspicion of criminality is unconstitutional.
Finally, the holding in Camara-that probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant may be found on grounds less
than those traditionally applied in Fourth Amendment
cases--demonstrates conclusively, we believe, , that this
Court is willing to fashion rules which refuse to straitjacket Fourth Amendment responses to differing degrees
of governmental intrusions on privacy.
Essentially, the X AACP -derides the balancing approach
because it believes that "reasonable suspicion" cannot be
defined. They say:
"But as to what citizen is it not reasonably possible
that he has committed some crime 1 As to what unlmown citizen on the street (even a crowded street)
near the scene of a known crime t As to what group of
ill-dressed young men on a ghetto street corner? As to
what Negro abroad on the streets in a 'white' neighborhood late in the day? Surely, it is reasonably
possible that each of these has committed a crime (or is
about to commit one, as the New York statute and common Stop-Frisk logic provide)." 37
The answer is, that without more, to none of them. It is
not reasonably possible (in the sense that we, and all the
courts which have upheld field detention, use the phrase
36.
37.

Id.
Brief for the NAACP 39-40. See also 45.
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"reasonable suspicion") to believe that anyone in these
categories has committed a crime and so is subject to detention. If the examples recited above contain all the information known to the officer, he is not authorized, under the
Fourth Amendment, to detain for interrogation. In effect,
the am.icu.s has constructed his examples of ''reasonable
suspicion'', and then, arguing their invalidity, has concluded that our definition is unworkable and unconstitutional. Since we emphatically reject his premise, we reject
also his conclusion.
"The courts have not in fact iniposed any limitations or restrictions upon the stop and frisk power once that
power is granted. They have not done so beca1t.se they
co1tld not do so-because the essence of the doctrine of
stop and frisk on less than probable cause is judicial abdication to police judgment. ' 138
( 4)

There are several answers to this argument. First, those
courts which have upheld stol? and frisk in cases we believe
to have been rightly decided (Terry and Dilley) have not
demonstrated "judicial abdication to police judgement".
Second, there exist numerous cases where state courts of
review, in construing traditional Fourth Amendment rules,
have, in the judgment of this Court, erred and have been
corrected. If there are cases dealing with stop and frisk
which ha\e been wrongly decided, explication of the proper
principles governing the disposition of the cases now before
the Court will serve to mark out standards in later cases.
'
It would hardly be surprising to find a few improper dispositions in an area of the law which, to date, contains
no precedential opinion of this Court. 'What is surprising
is the implicit assumption of the amicus that, thereafter, the
state trial and appellate courts would continue to sustain
field interrogation cases on less than reasonable grounds.
38. Brief for the NAACP 47.
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Nothing in the history of Fourth Amendment law warrants
this conclusion.
( 5) Courts cannot control the "frisk" or "search"
power since they "can;n,ot be faulted for believing that an
officer may always 'reasonably suspect' he is in danger.
That is the nature of reasonable suspicion.' 13 9
We can conceive of no reason why a decision whether an
officer rightfully frisked or searched following a detention
should be any harder to make than the decision whether an
officer rightfully frisked or searched following an arrest.
Since the standard is the same in both cases-a reasonable
need to protect the life of the officer or to prevent escapewhy should there be any difficulty in applying uniform
rules 1 Moreover, frisk or search will no more automatically
follow detention in every case than does frisk or search
automatically follow arrest in every case. The experience
of prior cases demonstrates that the courts have had no
difficulty in concluding that every police custody does not
call for a search incident to arrest even though the arrest
is made on probable cause. A reference to representative
opinions in which state courts of review have refused to
authorize blanket incidental searches, even for weapons, in
traffic arrests will illustrate the point:'0
AELE does not adhere to the view that since a search
can be made only incident to an arrest on probable cause,
only a frisk may be made incident to a detention on reasonable suspicion. The nature of the initial interference with
liberty is irrelevant to the kind of action which may be
taken by the officer for his own protection. Some detentions
may be more dangerous than arrests. Others will present
less risk to the officer. In both arrest and detention cases,
the proper question, in our view, is whether the action taken
39. Brief for the NAACP 51-52.
See SCHAEFER, TB.E SUSPECT AND

40.

SocIETY

42 (1967).
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by the officer was reasonably necessary for his own protection.41 Whether a search, frisk, or no action at all is proper
is a question to be determined by the facts of each case.
Under this standard the actions taken by the officers in
Terry and Dilley, for example, were reasonable in light of
the position in which they found themselves and should
be upheld.
( 6)

" ... we anticipate that the States of New York and

Ohio will make the familiar inflated claims for stop and frisk
as tools of law and order. If they do, let there be no mistake
about this call to practicality. Whatever its conveniences
and benefits to a narrow view of law-enforcement, stop and
frisk carries with it an intense danger of inciting destructive community conflict.' ' 42
Essentially, what the amicus is saying is that since the
stop and frisk practice presents a danger of police-citizen
conflict, it ought to be outlawed because the consequent
deterioration of police-community relations will erode
rather than strengthen law enforcement.
If only :field interrogation under reasonable circumstances
is authorized by the court as constitutionally permissible,
it makes no sense to say that the practice must be abandoned because it will exacerbate police-citizen relations in
the ghetto. Under some conditions even proper use of such
law enforcement powers like arrest, search, indictment and
prosecution will strain relations between society and persons subjected to those powers.43
41. Pilcher, The Law and Practice of Field Interrogation,
58 J. CRI.M . L., C. & P. S. 465, 479-84 (1967); Stern, Stop and
Frisk: An Historical Ans-wer to a Modern Problem, 58 J. CRIM.
L., C. & P. S. 532, 538 (1967).
42. Brief for the NAACP 68.
43. "It is not possible for the police to enforce the law and
preserve the peace without incurring some hostility and resentment. This is inherent in the very nature of police work." P~I
DENT's COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT A.ND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TA.SK FORCE REPORT: TBE POLICE 178.
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Even assuming that :field interrogation procedures may
endanger the effectiveness of law enforcement because of
the hostility created in the ghetto, the decision whether the
cost outweighs the gain is one for the states to makeeither by action of the legislature in restricting police
powers or by administrative action of the police themselves.
It is not a decision for this Court. It has nothing to do with
the question of whether stop and frisk is constitutional.*"
Carried to its logical end, the amicus argument would
compel the abolition of all law enforcement techniques which
create police-community hostility. We suppose that many
of the ghetto residents who rebel at the notion of stop and
frisk being practiced in their community would object to
even the very presence of police in their communityespecially in the numbers suggested by amicus as an alternative to detention.
The police could, of course, withdraw from the ghetto and
end all police-citizen conflicts. This aiternative might be
somewhat tolerable, if only criminals lived in the ghetto; at
least their interferences with human liberty in the form of
murder, robbery, rape and other crimes, would be practised
only upon each other. But others live in the ghetto as well
-innocent, law-abiding American citizens; by far the overwhelming majority. They are entitled, under the same
Constitution which the amicus says compels the rejection
of stop and frisk, to live their lives, and experience the
safety of their homes and their streets without fear of
criminal marauders. They have suffered enough-discrimination, poverty, lack of education, appalling conditions of
44. ''In order to balance the need for field interrogations and
the harmful effect on police-community relations which may result
from their indiscriminate use, State legislatures should define the
extent of police authority to stop and question persons, and police
departments should adopt detailed policies governing this authority
whether or not legislation exists." TASK FORCE REPORT: THE
POLICE supra note 43 at 185 (Emphasis added.)
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housing, and community alienation. ~rust they also be
deprived of their right to the protection of the law as well T

Conclusion.
Despite the evidence which has been found of cases in
which some police have abused :field interrogation in some
instances-evidence upon which the arnicus relies so heavily
-the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice unanimously recommends its
adoption and use :
' ' The Commission believes that there is a definite
need to authorize the police to stop suspects and possible witnesses of major crimes, to detain them for
brief questioning if they will not voluntarily cooperate,
and to search such suspects for dangerous weapons
when such precaution is necessary.' '411
Amicus Curiae requests that the judgment in Terry v.
Ohio be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

R. TROMPSO::\,
33 N. Dearborn Street,
Chicago, Illinois 60602,
Attorney for .Americans for Effective
Law Enforce1nent.
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45. TASK FORCE REPORT: THE PoLicE, supra note 43 at 184.
See also COMMISSION REPoRT 94-95.
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